- Udpate to 0.9.7b

5 files changed, 18 insertions, 140 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index c520d02657c4..057e3d9f1de2 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@
 #
 
 PORTNAME=	openssl
-PORTVERSION=	0.9.7a
-PORTREVISION=	2
+PORTVERSION=	0.9.7b
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 MASTER_SITES=	http://www.openssl.org/source/ \
 		ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ \
diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo
index 7596c06f5dd3..7412ecf78474 100644
--- a/security/openssl/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssl/distinfo
@@ -1 +1 @@
-MD5 (openssl-0.9.7a.tar.gz) = a0d3203ecf10989fdc61c784ae82e531
+MD5 (openssl-0.9.7b.tar.gz) = fae4bec090fa78e20f09d76d55b6ccff
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ab b/security/openssl/files/patch-Makefile.org
index 2aeb3617967e..5dd4f462d2cc 100644
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-ab
+++ b/security/openssl/files/patch-Makefile.org
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---- Makefile.org.orig	Thu Apr  5 13:08:02 2001
-+++ Makefile.org	Sat Oct 12 22:10:18 2002
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
+--- Makefile.org.orig	Tue Apr  8 13:54:32 2003
++++ Makefile.org	Fri Apr 11 20:01:14 2003
+@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
  MAKEFILE= Makefile.ssl
  MAKE=     make -f Makefile.ssl
  
@@ -9,11 +9,10 @@
  MAN1=1
  MAN3=3
  SHELL=/bin/sh
-@@ -250,6 +250,21 @@
- 	done
+@@ -274,6 +274,21 @@
  
  build-shared: clean-shared do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
-+
+ 
 +freebsd-shared:
 +	for i in ${SHLIBDIRS}; do \
 +	rm -f lib$$i.a lib$$i.so \
@@ -28,6 +27,16 @@
 +	for i in ${SHLIBDIRS}; do \
 +	ln -s lib$$i.so.${SHLIBVER} lib$$i.so; \
 +	done;
- 
++
  do_bsd-gcc-shared: do_gnu-shared
  do_linux-shared: do_gnu-shared
+ do_gnu-shared:
+@@ -593,7 +608,7 @@
+ 	@false
+ 
+ libclean:
+-	rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* engines/*.so *.a */lib */*/lib
++	rm -f *.map *.So *.So.* engines/*.so *.a */lib */*/lib
+ 
+ clean:	libclean
+ 	rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-security b/security/openssl/files/patch-security
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e3eefb36688..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-security
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-Index: crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /e/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.28.2.3
-diff -u -r1.28.2.3 rsa_eay.c
---- crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000	1.28.2.3
-+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
-@@ -195,6 +195,25 @@
- 	return(r);
- 	}
- 
-+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+	/* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
-+	if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
-+		ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
-+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
-+	do { \
-+		if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \
-+				((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
-+				!rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
-+			err_instr \
-+	} while(0)
-+
- /* signing */
- static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-@@ -239,8 +258,8 @@
- 		goto err;
- 		}
- 
--	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
--		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
-+	BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
-+
- 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- 		if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- 
-@@ -318,8 +337,8 @@
- 		goto err;
- 		}
- 
--	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
--		RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
-+	BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
-+
- 	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- 		if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- 
-Index: crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /e/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.30.2.2
-diff -u -r1.30.2.2 rsa_lib.c
---- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000	1.30.2.2
-+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
-@@ -72,7 +72,13 @@
- 
- RSA *RSA_new(void)
- 	{
--	return(RSA_new_method(NULL));
-+	RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING
-+	r->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
-+#endif
-+
-+	return r;
- 	}
- 
- void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 52777355a66b..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
---- ssl/s3_srvr.c	29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000	1.85.2.14
-+++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
-@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
- 		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- 			{
- 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
--			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-+			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
- 			}
- 
- 		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
-@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
- 				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
- 				{
- 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
--				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
--				goto f_err;
-+				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
-+
-+				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-+				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-+				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
-+				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
-+				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
-+				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
-+				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
-+				p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
- 				}
- 			}
- 
- 		if (al != -1)
- 			{
--#if 0
--			goto f_err;
--#else
- 			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
- 			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
--			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
--			 * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
--			 * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
--			 * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
--			 * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
--			 */
-+			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
- 			ERR_clear_error();
- 			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- 			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- 			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- 			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
--#endif
- 			}
- 	
- 		s->session->master_key_length=