lang/python33: Fix HTTP Header injection vulnerability

  - Backport of upstream fix for 3.4/3.5

PR:             210539
Submitted by:	Vladimir Krstulja <vlad-fbsd@acheronmedia.com>
Reported by:    Vladimir Krstulja <vlad-fbsd@acheronmedia.com>
Reviewed by:    robak, brnrd
MFH:		2016Q4
Security:       CVE-2016-5699
Security:       a61374fc-3a4d-11e6-a671-60a44ce6887b
Differential Revision:  D7107

3 files changed, 157 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/lang/python33/Makefile b/lang/python33/Makefile
index 0ad15145f8ca..313a7b6564d8 100644
--- a/lang/python33/Makefile
+++ b/lang/python33/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	python33
 PORTVERSION=	${PYTHON_PORTVERSION}
-PORTREVISION=	5
+PORTREVISION=	6
 CATEGORIES=	lang python ipv6
 MASTER_SITES=	PYTHON/ftp/python/${PORTVERSION}
 DISTNAME=	Python-${PORTVERSION}
diff --git a/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_http_client.py b/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_http_client.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1869780ea280
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_http_client.py
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+Based on and adapted for Python 3.3: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+# Date 1426151616 -7200
+# Node ID bf3e1c9b80e995311ba932e42200f076e03034c0
+# Parent  2b4a04c3681b1210529eb8a224cc007a0b92a890
+Issue #22928: Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client.
+Original patch by Demian Brecht.
+
+--- Lib/http/client.py.orig	2016-06-30 21:29:02 UTC
++++ Lib/http/client.py
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ import email.parser
+ import email.message
+ import io
+ import os
++import re
+ import socket
+ import collections
+ from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+@@ -216,6 +217,35 @@ MAXAMOUNT = 1048576
+ _MAXLINE = 65536
+ _MAXHEADERS = 100
+ 
++# Header name/value ABNF (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2)
++#
++# VCHAR          = %x21-7E
++# obs-text       = %x80-FF
++# header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
++# field-name     = token
++# field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
++# field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
++# field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
++#
++# obs-fold       = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
++#                ; obsolete line folding
++#                ; see Section 3.2.4
++
++# token          = 1*tchar
++#
++# tchar          = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
++#                / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
++#                / DIGIT / ALPHA
++#                ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
++#
++# VCHAR defined in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234#appendix-B.1
++
++# the patterns for both name and value are more leniant than RFC
++# definitions to allow for backwards compatibility
++_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(rb'^[^:\s][^:\r\n]*$').match
++_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
++
++
+ 
+ class HTTPMessage(email.message.Message):
+     # XXX The only usage of this method is in
+@@ -1035,12 +1065,20 @@ class HTTPConnection:
+ 
+         if hasattr(header, 'encode'):
+             header = header.encode('ascii')
++
++        if not _is_legal_header_name(header):
++            raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header,))
++
+         values = list(values)
+         for i, one_value in enumerate(values):
+             if hasattr(one_value, 'encode'):
+                 values[i] = one_value.encode('latin-1')
+             elif isinstance(one_value, int):
+                 values[i] = str(one_value).encode('ascii')
++
++            if _is_illegal_header_value(values[i]):
++                raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (values[i],))
++
+         value = b'\r\n\t'.join(values)
+         header = header + b': ' + value
+         self._output(header)
diff --git a/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_test_test__httplib.py b/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_test_test__httplib.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bef045a5fafa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python33/files/patch-Lib_test_test__httplib.py
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+Based on and adapted for Python 3.3: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+# Date 1426151616 -7200
+# Node ID bf3e1c9b80e995311ba932e42200f076e03034c0
+# Parent  2b4a04c3681b1210529eb8a224cc007a0b92a890
+Issue #22928: Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client.
+Original patch by Demian Brecht.
+
+--- Lib/test/test_httplib.py.orig	2016-06-30 21:31:29 UTC
++++ Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -134,6 +134,33 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
+         conn.putheader('Content-length', 42)
+         self.assertIn(b'Content-length: 42', conn._buffer)
+ 
++        conn.putheader('Foo', ' bar ')
++        self.assertIn(b'Foo:  bar ', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Bar', '\tbaz\t')
++        self.assertIn(b'Bar: \tbaz\t', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Authorization', 'Bearer mytoken')
++        self.assertIn(b'Authorization: Bearer mytoken', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('IterHeader', 'IterA', 'IterB')
++        self.assertIn(b'IterHeader: IterA\r\n\tIterB', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('LatinHeader', b'\xFF')
++        self.assertIn(b'LatinHeader: \xFF', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Utf8Header', b'\xc3\x80')
++        self.assertIn(b'Utf8Header: \xc3\x80', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('C1-Control', b'next\x85line')
++        self.assertIn(b'C1-Control: next\x85line', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Space', 'is\r\n allowed')
++        self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Space: is\r\n allowed', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Tab', 'is\r\n\tallowed')
++        self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Tab: is\r\n\tallowed', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('Key Space', 'value')
++        self.assertIn(b'Key Space: value', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader('KeySpace ', 'value')
++        self.assertIn(b'KeySpace : value', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space', 'value')
++        self.assertIn(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space: value', conn._buffer)
++        conn.putheader(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace', 'value')
++        self.assertIn(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace: value', conn._buffer)
++
+     def test_ipv6host_header(self):
+         # Default host header on IPv6 transaction should wrapped by [] if
+         # its actual IPv6 address
+@@ -153,6 +180,34 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
+         conn.request('GET', '/foo')
+         self.assertTrue(sock.data.startswith(expected))
+ 
++    def test_invalid_headers(self):
++        conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
++        conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
++        conn.putrequest('GET', '/')
++
++        # http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2.4, whitespace is no
++        # longer allowed in header names
++        cases = (
++            (b'Invalid\r\nName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'Invalid\rName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'Invalid\nName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'\r\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'\rInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b' InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'\tInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'Invalid:Name', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b':InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\r\nValue'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\rValue'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\nValue'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r\n'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r'),
++            (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\n'),
++        )
++        for name, value in cases:
++            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
++                conn.putheader(name, value)
+ 
+ class BasicTest(TestCase):
+     def test_status_lines(self):