diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/vuxml/vuln.xml | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml index 14508ee3de03..e786664a36d0 100644 --- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml +++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml @@ -34,6 +34,81 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file. --> <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1"> + <vuln vid="37e30313-9d8c-11db-858b-0060084a00e5"> + <topic>fetchmail -- crashes when refusing a message bound for an MDA</topic> + <affects> + <package> + <name>fetchmail</name> + <range><ge>6.3.5</ge><lt>6.3.6</lt></range> + </package> + </affects> + <description> + <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <p>Matthias Andree reports:</p> + <blockquote cite="http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-03.txt"> + <p>When delivering messages to a message delivery agent by means + of the "mda" option, fetchmail can crash (by passing + a NULL pointer to ferror() and fflush()) when refusing a message. + SMTP and LMTP delivery modes aren't affected.</p> + </blockquote> + </body> + </description> + <references> + <cvename>CVE-2006-5974</cvename> + <url>http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-03.txt</url> + </references> + <dates> + <discovery>2007-01-04</discovery> + <entry>2007-01-06</entry> + </dates> + </vuln> + + <vuln vid="5238ac45-9d8c-11db-858b-0060084a00e5"> + <topic>fetchmail -- TLS enforcement problem/MITM attack/password exposure</topic> + <affects> + <package> + <name>fetchmail</name> + <range><lt>6.3.6</lt></range> + </package> + </affects> + <description> + <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <p>Matthias Andree reports:</p> + <blockquote cite="http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt"> + <p>Fetchmail has had several longstanding password disclosure + vulnerabilities.</p> + <ul> + <li>sslcertck/sslfingerprint options should have implied + "sslproto tls1" in order to enforce TLS negotiation, + but did not.</li> + <li>Even with "sslproto tls1" in the config, fetches + would go ahead in plain text if STLS/STARTTLS wasn't available + (not advertised, or advertised but rejected).</li> + <li>POP3 fetches could completely ignore all TLS options + whether available or not because it didn't reliably issue + CAPA before checking for STLS support - but CAPA is a + requisite for STLS. Whether or not CAPAbilities were probed, + depended on the "auth" option. (Fetchmail only + tried CAPA if the auth option was not set at all, was set + to gssapi, kerberos, kerberos_v4, otp, or cram-md5.)</li> + <li>POP3 could fall back to using plain text passwords, even + if strong authentication had been configured.</li> + <li>POP2 would not complain if strong authentication or TLS + had been requested.</li> + </ul> + </blockquote> + </body> + </description> + <references> + <cvename>CVE-2006-5867</cvename> + <url>http://fetchmail.berlios.de/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt</url> + </references> + <dates> + <discovery>2007-01-04</discovery> + <entry>2007-01-06</entry> + </dates> + </vuln> + <vuln vid="78ad2525-9d0c-11db-a5f6-000c6ec775d9"> <topic>opera -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic> <affects> |