| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Feature safe: yes
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A deliberately constructed combination of records could cause named
to hang while populating the additional section of a response.
Security: http://www.vuxml.org/freebsd/57a700f9-12c0-11e2-9f86-001d923933b6.html
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Prevents a crash when queried for a record whose RDATA exceeds
65535 bytes.
Prevents a crash when validating caused by using "Bad cache" data
before it has been initialized.
ISC_QUEUE handling for recursive clients was updated to address
a race condition that could cause a memory leak. This rarely
occurred with UDP clients, but could be a significant problem
for a server handling a steady rate of TCP queries.
A condition has been corrected where improper handling of
zero-length RDATA could cause undesirable behavior, including
termination of the named process.
For more information: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00788
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in BIND9
High numbers of queries with DNSSEC validation enabled can cause an
assertion failure in named, caused by using a "bad cache" data structure
before it has been initialized.
CVE: CVE-2012-3817
Posting date: 24 July, 2012
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from ISC. These patched versions contain a critical bugfix:
Processing of DNS resource records where the rdata field is zero length
may cause various issues for the servers handling them.
Processing of these records may lead to unexpected outcomes. Recursive
servers may crash or disclose some portion of memory to the client.
Secondary servers may crash on restart after transferring a zone
containing these records. Master servers may corrupt zone data if the
zone option "auto-dnssec" is set to "maintain". Other unexpected
problems that are not listed here may also be encountered.
All BIND users are strongly encouraged to upgrade.
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the latest from ISC. These versions all contain the following:
Feature Change
* BIND now recognizes the TLSA resource record type, created to
support IETF DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities)
[RT #28989]
Bug Fix
* The locking strategy around the handling of iterative queries
has been tuned to reduce unnecessary contention in a multi-
threaded environment.
Each version also contains other critical bug fixes.
All BIND users are encouraged to upgrade to these latest versions.
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bug fixes.
For the port, switch to using the PORTDOCS macro.
Also, switch to the (identical) pkg-message in ../bind97 which was apparently missed
when the other ports were converted.
Feature safe: yes
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following DDOS bug:
Recursive name servers are failing with an assertion:
INSIST(! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
At this time it is not thought that authoritative-only servers
are affected, but information about this bug is evolving rapidly.
Because it may be possible to trigger this bug even on networks
that do not allow untrusted users to access the recursive name
servers (perhaps via specially crafted e-mail messages, and/or
malicious web sites) it is recommended that ALL operators of
recursive name servers upgrade immediately.
For more information see:
https://www.isc.org/software/bind/advisories/cve-2011-tbd
which will be updated as more information becomes available.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-4313
Feature safe: yes
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and improvements:
ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.6-ESV-R5/RELEASE-NOTES-BIND-9.6-ESV.html
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ALL BIND USERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO UPGRADE IMMEDIATELY
This update addresses the following vulnerability:
CVE-2011-2464
=============
Severity: High
Exploitable: Remotely
Description:
A defect in the affected BIND 9 versions allows an attacker to remotely
cause the "named" process to exit using a specially crafted packet. This
defect affects both recursive and authoritative servers. The code location
of the defect makes it impossible to protect BIND using ACLs configured
within named.conf or by disabling any features at compile-time or run-time.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-2464
https://www.isc.org/software/bind/advisories/cve-2011-2464
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1. Very large RRSIG RRsets included in a negative cache can trigger
an assertion failure that will crash named (BIND 9 DNS) due to an
off-by-one error in a buffer size check.
This bug affects all resolving name servers, whether DNSSEC validation
is enabled or not, on all BIND versions prior to today. There is a
possibility of malicious exploitation of this bug by remote users.
2. Named could fail to validate zones listed in a DLV that validated
insecure without using DLV and had DS records in the parent zone.
Add a patch provided by ru@ and confirmed by ISC to fix a crash at
shutdown time when a SIG(0) key is being used.
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All 9.6 users with DNSSEC validation enabled should upgrade to this
version, or the latest version in the 9.7 branch, prior to 2011-03-31 in
order to avoid validation failures for names in .COM as described here:
https://www.isc.org/announcement/bind-9-dnssec-validation-fails-new-ds-record
In addition the fixes for this and other bugs, there are also the following:
* Various fixes to kerberos support, including GSS-TSIG
* Various fixes to avoid leaking memory, and to problems that could prevent
a clean shutdown of named
Feature safe: yes
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the following security vulnerabilities.
For more information regarding these issues please see:
http://www.isc.org/announcement/guidance-regarding-dec-1st-2010-security-advisories
1. Cache incorrectly allows ncache and rrsig for the same type
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3613
Affects resolver operators whose servers are open to potential
attackers. Triggering the bug will cause the server to crash.
This bug applies even if you do not have DNSSEC enabled.
2. Using "allow-query" in the "options" or "view" statements to
restrict access to authoritative zones has no effect.
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3615
Affects authoritative server operators who wish to generally
restrict queries to their authoritative zones, and are running
9.6.2-P2 or any version of 9.7.x. The bug will allow unauthorized
end users to receive answers to queries they should not.
For the port:
1. Add CONFLICT for the ../bind-tools port
2. Remove CONFLICT for the removed ../bind9 port
3. Remove OPTION for threads on < RELENG_7
4. Switch to pkg-install to create the symlinks to /etc/namedb/ as
requested in [1]
PR: ports/151635 [1]
Submitted by: Benjamin Lee <ben@b1c1l1.com> [1]
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This version contains bug fixes that are relevant to any
caching/resolving name server; as well as DNSSEC-related
fixes.
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Named could return SERVFAIL for negative responses
from unsigned zones.
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related to the handling of broken DNSSEC trust chains.
This fix is only necessary for those who have DNSSEC validation
enabled and configure trust anchors from third parties, either
manually, or through a system like DLV.
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security patches to the 9.6.1 version, as well as many other bug fixes.
Due to the fact that the DNSSEC algorithm that will be used to sign the
root zone is only included in this version and in 9.7.x those who wish
to do validation MUST upgrade to one of these prior to July 2010.
Feature safe: yes
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the following vulnerabilities:
BIND 9 Cache Update from Additional Section
https://www.isc.org/advisories/CVE-2009-4022v6
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4022
A nameserver with DNSSEC validation enabled may incorrectly add
unauthenticated records to its cache that are received during the
resolution of a recursive client query
BIND 9 DNSSEC validation code could cause bogus NXDOMAIN responses
https://www.isc.org/advisories/CVE-2010-0097
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0097
There was an error in the DNSSEC NSEC/NSEC3 validation code that could
cause bogus NXDOMAIN responses (that is, NXDOMAIN responses for records
proven by NSEC or NSEC3 to exist) to be cached as if they had validated
correctly
These issues only affect systems with DNSSEC validation enabled.
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this is designed to fix is related to DNSSEC validation on a resolving
name server that allows access to untrusted users. If your system does
not fall into all 3 of these categories you do not need to update
immediately.
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The previous signatures were derived from the wrong key.
The new signatures all verify correctly.
No changes to the hashes for the software itself.
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Receipt of a specially-crafted dynamic update message may
cause BIND 9 servers to exit. This vulnerability affects all
servers -- it is not limited to those that are configured to
allow dynamic updates. Access controls will not provide an
effective workaround.
More details can be found here: https://www.isc.org/node/474
All BIND users are encouraged to update to a patched version ASAP.
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numerous bug fixes and updates, especially in the DNSSEC code, including
the new NSEC3 protocol. Full details are available at:
http://oldwww.isc.org/sw/bind/view/?release=9.6.1&noframes=1
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the fix for the following vulnerability: https://www.isc.org/node/373
Description:
Return values from OpenSSL library functions EVP_VerifyFinal()
and DSA_do_verify() were not checked properly.
Impact:
It is theoretically possible to spoof answers returned from
zones using the DNSKEY algorithms DSA (3) and NSEC3DSA (6).
In short, if you're not using DNSSEC to verify signatures you have
nothing to worry about.
While I'm here, address the issues raised in the PR by adding a knob
to disable building with OpenSSL altogether (which eliminates DNSSEC
capability), and fix the configure arguments to better deal with the
situation where the user has ssl bits in both the base and LOCALBASE.
PR: ports/126297
Submitted by: Ronald F.Guilmette <rfg@tristatelogic.com>
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improvements, including, "Additional support for query port randomization
including performance improvement and port range specification."
When building on amd64 ports' configure doesn't properly recognize our
arch, so help it along a bit. [1]
Submitted by: ivan jr sy <ivan_jr@yahoo.com> [1]
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signing key.
PR: ports/126389 (for bind9)
Submitted by: Tsurutani Naoki <turutani@scphys.kyoto-u.ac.jp>
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- performance improvement over the P1 releases, namely
+ significantly remedying the port allocation issues
+ allowing TCP queries and zone transfers while issuing as many
outstanding UDP queries as possible
+ additional security of port randomization at the same level as P1
- also includes fixes for several bugs in the 9.5.0 base code
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of the UDP query-source ports. The server will still use the same query
port for the life of the process, so users for whom the issue of cache
poisoning is highly significant may wish to periodically restart their
server using /etc/rc.d/named restart, or other suitable method.
In order to take advantage of this randomization users MUST have an
appropriate firewall configuration to allow UDP queries to be sent and
answers to be received on random ports; and users MUST NOT specify a
port number using the query-source[-v6] option.
The avoid-v[46]-udp-ports options exist for users who wish to eliminate
certain port numbers from being chosen by named for this purpose. See
the ARM Chatper 6 for more information.
Also please note, this issue applies only to UDP query ports. A random
ephemeral port is always chosen for TCP queries.
This issue applies primarily to name servers whose main purpose is to
resolve random queries (sometimes referred to as "caching" servers, or
more properly as "resolving" servers), although even an "authoritative"
name server will make some queries, primarily at startup time.
This update addresses issues raised in:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1447
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience
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Some of the important features of BIND 9 are:
DNS Security: DNSSEC (signed zones), TSIG (signed DNS requests)
IP version 6: Answers DNS queries on IPv6 sockets, IPv6 resource records (AAAA)
Experimental IPv6 Resolver Library
DNS Protocol Enhancements: IXFR, DDNS, Notify, EDNS0
Improved standards conformance
Views: One server process can provide multiple "views" of the DNS namespace,
e.g. an "inside" view to certain clients, and an "outside" view to others.
Multiprocessor Support, including working threads in this version
BIND 9.5 has a number of new features over previous versions, including:
GSS-TSIG support (RFC 3645), DHCID support
Experimental http server and statistics support for named via xml
More detailed statistics counters, compatible with the ones supported in BIND 8
Faster ACL processing
Efficient LRU cache cleaning mechanism.
NSID support (RFC 5001).
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file for more details.
Approved by: portmgr (erwin)
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1. The default access control lists (acls) are not being
correctly set. If not set anyone can make recursive queries
and/or query the cache contents.
See also:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2925
2. The DNS query id generation is vulnerable to cryptographic
analysis which provides a 1 in 8 chance of guessing the next
query id for 50% of the query ids. This can be used to perform
cache poisoning by an attacker.
This bug only affects outgoing queries, generated by BIND 9 to
answer questions as a resolver, or when it is looking up data
for internal uses, such as when sending NOTIFYs to slave name
servers.
All users are encouraged to upgrade.
See also:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-2926
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2172. [bug] query_addsoa() was being called with a non zone db.
[RT #16834]
If you are running BIND 9.4.0 (either pre-release or final),
you are advised to upgrade as soon as possible to BIND 9.4.1.
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following security issues. All users of BIND are encouraged to upgrade
to this version.
2126. [security] Serialise validation of type ANY responses. [RT #16555]
2124. [security] It was possible to dereference a freed fetch
context. [RT #16584]
2089. [security] Raise the minimum safe OpenSSL versions to
OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.8d. Versions
prior to these have known security flaws which
are (potentially) exploitable in named. [RT #16391]
2088. [security] Change the default RSA exponent from 3 to 65537.
[RT #16391]
2066. [security] Handle SIG queries gracefully. [RT #16300]
1941. [bug] ncache_adderesult() should set eresult even if no
rdataset is passed to it. [RT #15642]
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a maintenance release, with the usual round of bug and
security fixes.
All users of BIND 9 are encouraged to upgrade to this
version.
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announced by ISC dated 31 October (delivered via e-mail to the
bind-announce@isc.org list today):
Description:
Because of OpenSSL's recently announced vulnerabilities
(CAN-2006-4339, CVE-2006-2937 and CVE-2006-2940) which affect named,
we are announcing this workaround and releasing patches. A proof of
concept attack on OpenSSL has been demonstrated for CAN-2006-4339.
OpenSSL is required to use DNSSEC with BIND.
Fix for version 9.3.2-P1 and lower:
Upgrade to BIND 9.2.3-P2, then generate new RSASHA1 and
RSAMD5 keys for all old keys using the old default exponent
and perform a key rollover to these new keys.
These versions also change the default RSA exponent to be
65537 which is not vulnerable to the attacks described in
CAN-2006-4339.
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vulnerabilities:
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20060905-00590.pdf?lang=en
2066. [security] Handle SIG queries gracefully. [RT #16300]
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/697164
1941. [bug] ncache_adderesult() should set eresult even if no
rdataset is passed to it. [RT #15642]
All users of BIND 9 are encouraged to upgrade to this version.
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several important fixes, including a remote (although unlikely) exploit.
See the CHANGES file for details.
All users of BIND 9 are highly encouraged to upgrade to this version.
Changes to the port include:
1. Remove ISC patch to 9.3.0 that addressed the remote exploit
2. Change to OPTIONS, and thereby
3. --enable-threads is now the default. Users report that the new thread
code in 9.3.x works significantly better than the old on all versions of
FreeBSD.
4. Add a temporary shim for the old PORT_REPLACES_BASE_BIND9 option.
The OPTIONS framework requires knobs to start with WITH_ or WITHOUT_
5. Remove patch that shoehorned named.conf.5 into the right place,
it has been fixed in the code.
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Name: BIND: Self Check Failing [Added 2005.25.01]
Versions affected: BIND 9.3.0
Severity: LOW
Exploitable: Remotely
Type: Denial of Service
Description:
An incorrect assumption in the validator (authvalidated) can result in a
REQUIRE (internal consistancy) test failing and named exiting.
Workarounds:
Turn off dnssec validation (off by default) at the options/view level.
dnssec-enable no;
Active Exploits: None known
Bump PORTREVISION accordingly.
It should be noted that the vast majority of users would not have
DNSSEC enabled, and therefore are not vulnerable to this bug.
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significant updates, not the least of which is the new and improved
DNSSEC code based on the latest standards (including DS).
Various updates to the port, including:
1. Download the PGP signature
2. If running on ${OSVERSION} >= 503000, configure with threads
3. Update pkg-descr re IPv6 RRs
4. Update pkg-message to reflect a world with 6-current
There is also a patch to correct a man page installation error.
This problem should be fixed in the next release.
Approved by: portmgr (marcus)
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The 9.2.3 code has many many bugs fixed from 9.2.2, check CHANGES
for more information.
The rc4 code has the delegation-only options. Check the ARM for
information on how to enable it.
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new features compared to 9.2.1, only bug fixes. Users of BIND 9 are
highly encouraged to upgrade.
* Switch to Makefile COMMENT
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is widely considered to be more stable than 9.2.1. I would have preferred
a -REL version, but better is better.
* Clean up the Makefile a little
* Just say no to threads
* Add the PORT_REPLACES_BASE magic, similar to the bind8 port
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see /usr/local/share/doc/bind9/CHANGES after installation for details.
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are fixed in this version, however BIND 9 is still recommended only
for early adopters, and those that have time to closely monitor
their name service.
* Change PORTNAME to bind9 so that 'pkg_add -r bind' does the right thing
* Use the local version of openssl, and disable threads on all but
the most recent -current. Thread support is still considered experimental.
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some IXFR problems.
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it is highly recommended that all users of BIND 9 upgrade to this
maintenance release.
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bind 9, upgrade to this version.
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use BIND 9 this upgrade is highly recommended.
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Requested by: Joong Hyun Kim <better@ns1.betterbox.net>
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PR: ports/22941
Submitted by: Leif Neland, leifn@neland.dk
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of other neat things like that. Sorry for the delay.
Repo-copy by: asami
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The history is safe, so just "cvs add" the files back when bind9 is
ready to be committed.
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Many people submitted patches for this one, and a combination of them
were used.
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Submitted by: ust@cert.siemens.de
PR: ports/12875
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Requested By: a bazillion people both on mailing lists and #FreeBSD.
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PR: ports/11784
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Submitted by: Brad Hendrickse <bradh@uunet.co.za>
PR: ports/10861
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Submitted by: Studded@dal.net
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PR: ports/4118
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