From ed869513a51c6342d08f761aa695460060be29c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: royger Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 13:32:53 +0000 Subject: xen: apply XSA-212 And do some portlint fixing (thanks to Li-Wen Hsu). Approved by: lwshu Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D MFH: 2017Q1 --- emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile | 11 +++-- emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch (limited to 'emulators') diff --git a/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile b/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile index 88e0d81f88e2..56c788311c54 100644 --- a/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile +++ b/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ # $FreeBSD$ PORTNAME= xen -PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel PORTVERSION= 4.7.2 -PORTREVISION= 0 +PORTREVISION= 1 CATEGORIES= emulators MASTER_SITES= http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/ +PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel MAINTAINER= royger@FreeBSD.org COMMENT= Hypervisor using a microkernel design @@ -41,16 +41,17 @@ EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logdirty-prevent-preemption-if-finished.patc ${FILESDIR}/0002-xen-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p1 \ ${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1 \ ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-drop-unneeded-__packed-attributes.patch:-p1 \ - ${FILESDIR}/0002-build-clang-fix-XSM-dummy-policy-when-using-clang-4..patch:-p1 + ${FILESDIR}/0002-build-clang-fix-XSM-dummy-policy-when-using-clang-4..patch:-p1 \ + ${FILESDIR}/xsa212.patch:-p1 .include .if ${OPSYS} != FreeBSD -IGNORE= Only supported on FreeBSD +IGNORE= only supported on FreeBSD .endif .if ${OSVERSION} < 1100055 -IGNORE= Only supported on recent FreeBSD 11 +IGNORE= only supported on recent FreeBSD 11 .endif pre-build: diff --git a/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch b/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2c435c413644 --- /dev/null +++ b/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +memory: properly check guest memory ranges in XENMEM_exchange handling + +The use of guest_handle_okay() here (as introduced by the XSA-29 fix) +is insufficient here, guest_handle_subrange_okay() needs to be used +instead. + +Note that the uses are okay in +- XENMEM_add_to_physmap_batch handling due to the size field being only + 16 bits wide, +- livepatch_list() due to the limit of 1024 enforced on the + number-of-entries input (leaving aside the fact that this can be + called by a privileged domain only anyway), +- compat mode handling due to counts there being limited to 32 bits, +- everywhere else due to guest arrays being accessed sequentially from + index zero. + +This is XSA-212. + +Reported-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper + +--- a/xen/common/memory.c ++++ b/xen/common/memory.c +@@ -436,8 +436,8 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA + goto fail_early; + } + +- if ( !guest_handle_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.in.nr_extents) || +- !guest_handle_okay(exch.out.extent_start, exch.out.nr_extents) ) ++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.nr_exchanged, ++ exch.in.nr_extents - 1) ) + { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto fail_early; +@@ -447,11 +447,27 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA + { + in_chunk_order = exch.out.extent_order - exch.in.extent_order; + out_chunk_order = 0; ++ ++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start, ++ exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order, ++ exch.out.nr_extents - 1) ) ++ { ++ rc = -EFAULT; ++ goto fail_early; ++ } + } + else + { + in_chunk_order = 0; + out_chunk_order = exch.in.extent_order - exch.out.extent_order; ++ ++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start, ++ exch.nr_exchanged << out_chunk_order, ++ exch.out.nr_extents - 1) ) ++ { ++ rc = -EFAULT; ++ goto fail_early; ++ } + } + + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid); +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h +@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long * + /* + * Valid if in +ve half of 48-bit address space, or above Xen-reserved area. + * This is also valid for range checks (addr, addr+size). As long as the +- * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area then we will access a +- * non-canonical address (and thus fault) before ever reaching VIRT_START. ++ * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area, sequential accesses ++ * (starting at addr) will hit a non-canonical address (and thus fault) ++ * before ever reaching VIRT_START. + */ + #define __addr_ok(addr) \ + (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<47)) || \ +@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long * + (__addr_ok(addr) || is_compat_arg_xlat_range(addr, size)) + + #define array_access_ok(addr, count, size) \ +- (access_ok(addr, (count)*(size))) ++ (likely(((count) ?: 0UL) < (~0UL / (size))) && \ ++ access_ok(addr, (count) * (size))) + + #define __compat_addr_ok(d, addr) \ + ((unsigned long)(addr) < HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d)) -- cgit