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author | Felix Lange <fjl@users.noreply.github.com> | 2018-07-03 21:24:12 +0800 |
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committer | Péter Szilágyi <peterke@gmail.com> | 2018-07-03 21:24:12 +0800 |
commit | c73b654fd172464f598c239b4e7c4bc07a641e3b (patch) | |
tree | c6616006898280d05a3cc63d0a8b76d102ff18ba /p2p/discover/udp.go | |
parent | 9da128db704d6ae11ec853bf38d6a4e7ac412fdb (diff) | |
download | go-tangerine-c73b654fd172464f598c239b4e7c4bc07a641e3b.tar.gz go-tangerine-c73b654fd172464f598c239b4e7c4bc07a641e3b.tar.zst go-tangerine-c73b654fd172464f598c239b4e7c4bc07a641e3b.zip |
p2p/discover: move bond logic from table to transport (#17048)
* p2p/discover: move bond logic from table to transport
This commit moves node endpoint verification (bonding) from the table to
the UDP transport implementation. Previously, adding a node to the table
entailed pinging the node if needed. With this change, the ping-back
logic is embedded in the packet handler at a lower level.
It is easy to verify that the basic protocol is unchanged: we still
require a valid pong reply from the node before findnode is accepted.
The node database tracked the time of last ping sent to the node and
time of last valid pong received from the node. Node endpoints are
considered verified when a valid pong is received and the time of last
pong was called 'bond time'. The time of last ping sent was unused. In
this commit, the last ping database entry is repurposed to mean last
ping _received_. This entry is now used to track whether the node needs
to be pinged back.
The other big change is how nodes are added to the table. We used to add
nodes in Table.bond, which ran when a remote node pinged us or when we
encountered the node in a neighbors reply. The transport now adds to the
table directly after the endpoint is verified through ping. To ensure
that the Table can't be filled just by pinging the node repeatedly, we
retain the isInitDone check. During init, only nodes from neighbors
replies are added.
* p2p/discover: reduce findnode failure counter on success
* p2p/discover: remove unused parameter of loadSeedNodes
* p2p/discover: improve ping-back check and comments
* p2p/discover: add neighbors reply nodes always, not just during init
Diffstat (limited to 'p2p/discover/udp.go')
-rw-r--r-- | p2p/discover/udp.go | 59 |
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/p2p/discover/udp.go b/p2p/discover/udp.go index f6bcd9708..0ff47c5e4 100644 --- a/p2p/discover/udp.go +++ b/p2p/discover/udp.go @@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ import ( "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp" ) -const Version = 4 - // Errors var ( errPacketTooSmall = errors.New("too small") @@ -272,21 +270,33 @@ func (t *udp) close() { // ping sends a ping message to the given node and waits for a reply. func (t *udp) ping(toid NodeID, toaddr *net.UDPAddr) error { + return <-t.sendPing(toid, toaddr, nil) +} + +// sendPing sends a ping message to the given node and invokes the callback +// when the reply arrives. +func (t *udp) sendPing(toid NodeID, toaddr *net.UDPAddr, callback func()) <-chan error { req := &ping{ - Version: Version, + Version: 4, From: t.ourEndpoint, To: makeEndpoint(toaddr, 0), // TODO: maybe use known TCP port from DB Expiration: uint64(time.Now().Add(expiration).Unix()), } packet, hash, err := encodePacket(t.priv, pingPacket, req) if err != nil { - return err + errc := make(chan error, 1) + errc <- err + return errc } errc := t.pending(toid, pongPacket, func(p interface{}) bool { - return bytes.Equal(p.(*pong).ReplyTok, hash) + ok := bytes.Equal(p.(*pong).ReplyTok, hash) + if ok && callback != nil { + callback() + } + return ok }) t.write(toaddr, req.name(), packet) - return <-errc + return errc } func (t *udp) waitping(from NodeID) error { @@ -296,6 +306,13 @@ func (t *udp) waitping(from NodeID) error { // findnode sends a findnode request to the given node and waits until // the node has sent up to k neighbors. func (t *udp) findnode(toid NodeID, toaddr *net.UDPAddr, target NodeID) ([]*Node, error) { + // If we haven't seen a ping from the destination node for a while, it won't remember + // our endpoint proof and reject findnode. Solicit a ping first. + if time.Since(t.db.lastPingReceived(toid)) > nodeDBNodeExpiration { + t.ping(toid, toaddr) + t.waitping(toid) + } + nodes := make([]*Node, 0, bucketSize) nreceived := 0 errc := t.pending(toid, neighborsPacket, func(r interface{}) bool { @@ -315,8 +332,7 @@ func (t *udp) findnode(toid NodeID, toaddr *net.UDPAddr, target NodeID) ([]*Node Target: target, Expiration: uint64(time.Now().Add(expiration).Unix()), }) - err := <-errc - return nodes, err + return nodes, <-errc } // pending adds a reply callback to the pending reply queue. @@ -587,10 +603,17 @@ func (req *ping) handle(t *udp, from *net.UDPAddr, fromID NodeID, mac []byte) er ReplyTok: mac, Expiration: uint64(time.Now().Add(expiration).Unix()), }) - if !t.handleReply(fromID, pingPacket, req) { - // Note: we're ignoring the provided IP address right now - go t.bond(true, fromID, from, req.From.TCP) + t.handleReply(fromID, pingPacket, req) + + // Add the node to the table. Before doing so, ensure that we have a recent enough pong + // recorded in the database so their findnode requests will be accepted later. + n := NewNode(fromID, from.IP, uint16(from.Port), req.From.TCP) + if time.Since(t.db.lastPongReceived(fromID)) > nodeDBNodeExpiration { + t.sendPing(fromID, from, func() { t.addThroughPing(n) }) + } else { + t.addThroughPing(n) } + t.db.updateLastPingReceived(fromID, time.Now()) return nil } @@ -603,6 +626,7 @@ func (req *pong) handle(t *udp, from *net.UDPAddr, fromID NodeID, mac []byte) er if !t.handleReply(fromID, pongPacket, req) { return errUnsolicitedReply } + t.db.updateLastPongReceived(fromID, time.Now()) return nil } @@ -613,13 +637,12 @@ func (req *findnode) handle(t *udp, from *net.UDPAddr, fromID NodeID, mac []byte return errExpired } if !t.db.hasBond(fromID) { - // No bond exists, we don't process the packet. This prevents - // an attack vector where the discovery protocol could be used - // to amplify traffic in a DDOS attack. A malicious actor - // would send a findnode request with the IP address and UDP - // port of the target as the source address. The recipient of - // the findnode packet would then send a neighbors packet - // (which is a much bigger packet than findnode) to the victim. + // No endpoint proof pong exists, we don't process the packet. This prevents an + // attack vector where the discovery protocol could be used to amplify traffic in a + // DDOS attack. A malicious actor would send a findnode request with the IP address + // and UDP port of the target as the source address. The recipient of the findnode + // packet would then send a neighbors packet (which is a much bigger packet than + // findnode) to the victim. return errUnknownNode } target := crypto.Keccak256Hash(req.Target[:]) |