www/apache24: Fix httpoxy vulnerability (+2.2)

  - Add upstream patch to www/apache24
  - Add upstream patch to www/apache22
  - Bump PORTREVISION

Approved by:    feld (ports-secteam)
MFH:            2016Q3
Security:       cf0b5668-4d1b-11e6-b2ec-b499baebfeaf
Security:       CVE-2016-5387

4 files changed, 128 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/www/apache22/Makefile b/www/apache22/Makefile
index 6b3014f3912f..4d998041ee29 100644
--- a/www/apache22/Makefile
+++ b/www/apache22/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	apache22
 PORTVERSION=	2.2.31
-PORTREVISION?=	0
+PORTREVISION?=	1
 CATEGORIES=	www ipv6
 MASTER_SITES=	APACHE_HTTPD
 DISTNAME=	httpd-${PORTVERSION}
diff --git a/www/apache22/files/patch-httpoxy b/www/apache22/files/patch-httpoxy
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9331f3c053ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache22/files/patch-httpoxy
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+https://www.apache.org/security/asf-httpoxy-response.txt
+
+Apache HTTP Server may be configured to proxy HTTP requests as a forward
+or reverse (gateway) proxy server, can proxy requests to a FastCGI service
+using mod_proxy_fcgi, can directly serve CGI applications using mod_cgi
+or mod_cgid or the related mod_isapi service. The project's mod_fcgid
+subproject (available as a separate add-in module) directly manages CGI
+scripts using the FastCGI protocol.
+
+It may also be configured to directly host a number of external modules
+which run CGI-style applications in-process. The server itself does not 
+modify the CGI environment in this case, however, these external modules
+may perform such modifications of their environment variables in-process.
+Such examples include mod_php, mod_perl and mod_wsgi.
+
+To mitigate "httpoxy" issues across all of the above mechanisms, the most
+direct solution is to drop any "Proxy:" header arriving from an upstream
+proxy server or the origin user-agent. this will mitigate the issue for any
+vulnerable back-end server or CGI across all traffic through this server. 
+
+The two lines below enabled in the httpd.conf file will remove the "Proxy:"
+header from all incoming requests, before further processing;
+
+    LoadModule headers_module {path-to}/mod_headers.so
+
+    RequestHeader unset Proxy early
+
+(Users who have mod_headers compiled-in to the httpd binary must omit
+the LoadModule directive above, others must adjust the {path-to} to point
+to the mod_headers.so file.)
+
+If the administrator wishes to preserve the value of the "Proxy:" header
+for most traffic, and only eliminate it from the CGI environment variable
+HTTP_PROXY, a second mitigation is offered. This patch will address this
+behavior in mod_cgi, mod_cgid, mod_isapi, mod_proxy_fcgi and mod_fcgid,
+along with all other consumers of httpd's built-in environment handling.
+
+The bundled httpd modules all rely on ap_add_common_vars() to set up the
+target CGI environment. The project will include the recommended patch
+below in all subsequent releases of httpd, including 2.4.24 and 2.2.32.
+Users who build httpd 2.2.x or 2.4.x from source may apply the patch below,
+recompile and re-install httpd to obtain this mitigation. This migitation
+has been assigned the identifier CVE-2016-5387 <http://cve.mitre.org>.
+
+======= Patch to httpd sources 2.4.x and 2.2.x =======
+
+--- server/util_script.c	(revision 1752426)
++++ server/util_script.c	(working copy)
+@@ -186,6 +186,14 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_add_common_vars(request_rec *r
+         else if (!strcasecmp(hdrs[i].key, "Content-length")) {
+             apr_table_addn(e, "CONTENT_LENGTH", hdrs[i].val);
+         }
++        /* HTTP_PROXY collides with a popular envvar used to configure
++         * proxies, don't let clients set/override it.  But, if you must...
++         */
++#ifndef SECURITY_HOLE_PASS_PROXY
++        else if (!strcasecmp(hdrs[i].key, "Proxy")) {
++            ;
++        }
++#endif
+         /*
+          * You really don't want to disable this check, since it leaves you
+          * wide open to CGIs stealing passwords and people viewing them
diff --git a/www/apache24/Makefile b/www/apache24/Makefile
index 08919487f318..98f17ef44b60 100644
--- a/www/apache24/Makefile
+++ b/www/apache24/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	apache24
 PORTVERSION=	2.4.23
+PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	www ipv6
 MASTER_SITES=	APACHE_HTTPD
 DISTNAME=	httpd-${PORTVERSION}
diff --git a/www/apache24/files/patch-httpoxy b/www/apache24/files/patch-httpoxy
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9331f3c053ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache24/files/patch-httpoxy
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+https://www.apache.org/security/asf-httpoxy-response.txt
+
+Apache HTTP Server may be configured to proxy HTTP requests as a forward
+or reverse (gateway) proxy server, can proxy requests to a FastCGI service
+using mod_proxy_fcgi, can directly serve CGI applications using mod_cgi
+or mod_cgid or the related mod_isapi service. The project's mod_fcgid
+subproject (available as a separate add-in module) directly manages CGI
+scripts using the FastCGI protocol.
+
+It may also be configured to directly host a number of external modules
+which run CGI-style applications in-process. The server itself does not 
+modify the CGI environment in this case, however, these external modules
+may perform such modifications of their environment variables in-process.
+Such examples include mod_php, mod_perl and mod_wsgi.
+
+To mitigate "httpoxy" issues across all of the above mechanisms, the most
+direct solution is to drop any "Proxy:" header arriving from an upstream
+proxy server or the origin user-agent. this will mitigate the issue for any
+vulnerable back-end server or CGI across all traffic through this server. 
+
+The two lines below enabled in the httpd.conf file will remove the "Proxy:"
+header from all incoming requests, before further processing;
+
+    LoadModule headers_module {path-to}/mod_headers.so
+
+    RequestHeader unset Proxy early
+
+(Users who have mod_headers compiled-in to the httpd binary must omit
+the LoadModule directive above, others must adjust the {path-to} to point
+to the mod_headers.so file.)
+
+If the administrator wishes to preserve the value of the "Proxy:" header
+for most traffic, and only eliminate it from the CGI environment variable
+HTTP_PROXY, a second mitigation is offered. This patch will address this
+behavior in mod_cgi, mod_cgid, mod_isapi, mod_proxy_fcgi and mod_fcgid,
+along with all other consumers of httpd's built-in environment handling.
+
+The bundled httpd modules all rely on ap_add_common_vars() to set up the
+target CGI environment. The project will include the recommended patch
+below in all subsequent releases of httpd, including 2.4.24 and 2.2.32.
+Users who build httpd 2.2.x or 2.4.x from source may apply the patch below,
+recompile and re-install httpd to obtain this mitigation. This migitation
+has been assigned the identifier CVE-2016-5387 <http://cve.mitre.org>.
+
+======= Patch to httpd sources 2.4.x and 2.2.x =======
+
+--- server/util_script.c	(revision 1752426)
++++ server/util_script.c	(working copy)
+@@ -186,6 +186,14 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_add_common_vars(request_rec *r
+         else if (!strcasecmp(hdrs[i].key, "Content-length")) {
+             apr_table_addn(e, "CONTENT_LENGTH", hdrs[i].val);
+         }
++        /* HTTP_PROXY collides with a popular envvar used to configure
++         * proxies, don't let clients set/override it.  But, if you must...
++         */
++#ifndef SECURITY_HOLE_PASS_PROXY
++        else if (!strcasecmp(hdrs[i].key, "Proxy")) {
++            ;
++        }
++#endif
+         /*
+          * You really don't want to disable this check, since it leaves you
+          * wide open to CGIs stealing passwords and people viewing them