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| author | remko <remko@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-02-28 04:00:37 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | remko <remko@FreeBSD.org> | 2007-02-28 04:00:37 +0800 |
| commit | 4558cf1074c31b150981122f6e9ebebe6f9ce737 (patch) | |
| tree | 6f0ca90ff9274ecb24f505fd3c70d9e06f2f442b /security | |
| parent | d4cfc63611341b819893eb21b35a985595c39b96 (diff) | |
| download | freebsd-ports-graphics-4558cf1074c31b150981122f6e9ebebe6f9ce737.tar.gz freebsd-ports-graphics-4558cf1074c31b150981122f6e9ebebe6f9ce737.tar.zst freebsd-ports-graphics-4558cf1074c31b150981122f6e9ebebe6f9ce737.zip | |
Document FreeBSD -- Jail rc.d script privilege escalation
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/vuxml/vuln.xml | 60 |
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml index 15d008bc4b3..8d4a1517994 100644 --- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml +++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml @@ -34,6 +34,66 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file. --> <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1"> + <vuln vid="46b922a8-c69c-11db-9f82-000e0c2e438a"> + <topic>FreeBSD -- Jail rc.d script privilege escalation</topic> + <affects> + <system> + <name>FreeBSD</name> + <range><gt>6.1</gt><lt>6.1_12</lt></range> + <range><gt>6.0</gt><lt>6.0_17</lt></range> + <range><gt>5.5</gt><lt>5.5_10</lt></range> + </system> + </affects> + <description> + <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <h1>Problem Description:</h1> + <p>In multiple situations the host's jail rc.d(8) script does + not check if a path inside the jail file system structure is + a symbolic link before using the path. In particular this is + the case when writing the output from the jail start-up to + /var/log/console.log and when mounting and unmounting file + systems inside the jail directory structure.</p> + <h1>Impact:</h1> + <p>Due to the lack of handling of potential symbolic links the + host's jail rc.d(8) script is vulnerable to "symlink + attacks". By replacing /var/log/console.log inside the jail + with a symbolic link it is possible for the superuser (root) + inside the jail to overwrite files on the host system outside + the jail with arbitrary content. This in turn can be used to + execute arbitrary commands with non-jailed superuser + privileges.</p> + <p>Similarly, by changing directory mount points inside the + jail file system structure into symbolic links, it may be + possible for a jailed attacker to mount file systems which + were meant to be mounted inside the jail at arbitrary points + in the host file system structure, or to unmount arbitrary + file systems on the host system.</p> + <p>NOTE WELL: The above vulnerabilities occur only when a jail + is being started or stopped using the host's jail rc.d(8) + script; once started (and until stopped), running jails + cannot exploit this.</p> + <h1>Workaround:</h1> + <p>If the sysctl(8) variable security.jail.chflags_allowed is + set to 0 (the default), setting the "sunlnk" system flag on + /var, /var/log, /var/log/console.log, and all file system + mount points and their parent directories inside the jail(s) + will ensure that the console log file and mount points are + not replaced by symbolic links. If this is done while jails + are running, the administrator must check that an attacker + has not replaced any directories with symlinks after setting + the "sunlnk" flag.</p> + </body> + </description> + <references> + <cvename>CVE-2007-0166</cvename> + <freebsdsa>SA-07:01.jail</freebsdsa> + </references> + <dates> + <discovery>2007-01-11</discovery> + <entry>2007-02-27</entry> + </dates> + </vuln> + <vuln vid="44449bf7-c69b-11db-9f82-000e0c2e438a"> <topic>gtar -- name mangling symlink vulnerability</topic> <affects> |