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authorchriseth <c@ethdev.com>2016-07-05 23:20:30 +0800
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Merge pull request #693 from chriseth/sec
Security Considerations
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+#######################
+Security Considerations
+#######################
+
+While it is usually quite easy to build software that works as expected,
+it is much harder to check that nobody can use it in a way that was **not** anticipated.
+
+In Solidity, this is even more important because you can use smart contracts
+to handle tokens or even more valuable things. Furthermore, every execution of a smart
+contract happens in public as it is mostly open source.
+
+Of course you always have to consider how much is at stake:
+You can compare a smart contract with a web service that is open to the
+public (and thus also to malicous actors) and perhaps even open source.
+If you only store your grocery list on that web service, you might not have
+to take too much care, but if you manage your bank account using that web service,
+you should be more careful.
+
+This section will list some pitfalls and general security recommendations but
+can of course never be complete. Also keep in mind that even if your
+smart contract code is bug-free, the compiler or the platform itself might
+have a bug.
+
+As always with open source documentation, please help us extend this section
+(especially, some examples would not hurt)!
+
+********
+Pitfalls
+********
+
+Private Information and Randomness
+==================================
+
+Everything you use in a smart contract is publicly visible, even
+local variables and state variables marked ``private``.
+
+Using random numbers in smart contracts is quite tricky if you do not want
+miners to be able to cheat.
+
+Re-Entrancy
+===========
+
+Any interaction from a contract (A) with another contract (B) and any transfer
+of Ether hands over control to that contract (B). This makes it possible for B
+to call back into A before this interaction is completed. To give an example,
+the following code contains a bug (it is just a snippet and not a
+complete contract):
+
+::
+
+ // THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BUG - DO NOT USE
+ contract Fund {
+ /// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
+ mapping(address => uint) shares;
+ /// Withdraw your share.
+ function withdraw() {
+ if (msg.sender.send(shares[msg.sender]))
+ shares[msg.sender] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+The problem is not too serious here because of the limited gas as part
+of ``send``, but it still exposes a weakness: Ether transfer always
+includes code execution, so the recipient could be a contract that calls
+back into ``withdraw``. This would enable it to get a multiple refund and
+basically retrieve all the Ether in the contract.
+
+To avoid re-entrancy, you can use the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern as
+outlined further below:
+
+::
+
+ contract Fund {
+ /// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
+ mapping(address => uint) shares;
+ /// Withdraw your share.
+ function withdraw() {
+ var share = shares[msg.sender];
+ shares[msg.sender] = 0;
+ if (!msg.sender.send(share))
+ throw;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+Note that re-entrancy is not only an effect of Ether transfer but of any
+function call on another contract. Furthermore, you also have to take
+multi-contract situations into account. A called contract could modify the
+state of another contract you depend on.
+
+Gas Limit and Loops
+===================
+
+Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, e.g. loops that depends on storage values, have to be used carefully:
+Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. Either explicitly or just due to
+normal operation, the number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit, which can cause the complete
+contract to be stalled at a certain point. This does not apply at full extent to ``constant`` functions that are only executed
+to read data from the blockchain. Still, such functions may be called by other contracts as part of on-chain operations
+and stall those. Please be explicit about such cases in the documentation of your contracts.
+
+Sending and Receiving Ether
+===========================
+
+- If a contract receives Ether (without a function being called), the fallback function is executed. The contract can only rely
+ on the "gas stipend" (2300 gas) being available to it at that time. This stipend is not enough to access storage in any way.
+ To be sure that your contract can receive Ether in that way, check the gas requirements of the fallback function
+ (for example in the "details" section in browser-solidity).
+
+- There is a way to forward more gas to the receiving contract using
+ ``addr.call.value(x)()``. This is essentially the same as ``addr.send(x)``,
+ only that it forwards all remaining gas and opens up the ability for the
+ recipient to perform more expensive actions. This might include calling back
+ into the sending contract or other state changes you might not have though of.
+ So it allows for great flexibility for honest users but also for malicious actors.
+
+- If you want to send ether using ``address.send``, there are certain details to be aware of:
+
+ 1. If the recipient is a contract, it causes its fallback function to be executed which can in turn call back into the sending contract
+ 2. Sending Ether can fail due to the call depth going above 1024. Since the caller is in total control of the call
+ depth, they can force the transfer to fail, so make sure to always check the return value of ``send``. Better yet,
+ write your contract using a pattern where the recipient can withdraw Ether instead.
+ 3. Sending Ether can also fail because the execution of the recipient contract
+ requires more than the allotted amount of gas (explicitly by using ``throw`` or
+ because the operation is just too expensive) - it "runs out of gas" (OOG).
+ If the return value of ``send`` is checked, this might provide a
+ means for the recipient to block progress in the sending contract. Again, the best practise here is to use
+ a "withdraw" pattern instead of a "send" pattern.
+
+Callstack Depth
+===============
+
+External function calls can fail any time because they exceed the maximum
+call stack of 1024. In such situations, Solidity throws an exception.
+Malicious actors might be able to force the call stack to a high value
+before they interact with your contract.
+
+Note that ``.send()`` does **not** throw an exception if the call stack is
+depleted but rather returns ``false`` in that case. The low-level functions
+``.call()``, ``.callcode()`` and ``.delegatecall()`` behave in the same way.
+
+Minor Details
+=============
+
+- In ``for (var i = 0; i < arrayName.length; i++) { ... }``, the type of ``i`` will be ``uint8``, because this is the smallest type that is required to hold the value ``0``. If the array has more than 255 elements, the loop will not terminate.
+- The ``constant`` keyword for functions is currently not enforced by the compiler.
+ Furthermore, it is not enforced by the EVM, so a contract function that "claims"
+ to be constant might still cause changes to the state.
+- Types that do not occupy the full 32 bytes might contain "dirty higher order bits".
+ This is especially important if you access ``msg.data`` - it poses a malleability risk.
+
+***************
+Recommendations
+***************
+
+Restrict the Amount of Ether
+============================
+
+Restrict the amount of Ether (or other tokens) that can be stored in a smart
+contract. If your source code, the compiler or the platform has a bug, these
+funds might be gone. If you want to limit your loss, limit the amount of Ether.
+
+Keep it Small and Modular
+=========================
+
+Keep your contracts small and easily understandable. Single out unrelated
+functionality in other contracts or into libraries. General recommendations
+about source code quality of course apply: Limit the amount of local variables,
+the length of functions and so on. Document your functions so that others
+can see what your intention was and whether it is different than what the code does.
+
+Use the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern
+===========================================
+
+Most functions will first perform some checks (who called the function,
+are the arguments in range, did they send enough Ether, does the person
+have tokens, ...). These checks should be done first.
+
+As the second step, if all checks passed, effects to the state variables
+of the current contract should be made. Interaction with other contracts
+should be the very last step in any function.
+
+Early contracts delayed some effects and waited for external function
+calls to return in a non-error state. This is often a serious mistake,
+because of the re-entrancy problem explained above.
+
+Note that also calls to known contracts might in turn cause calls to
+unknown contracts, so it is probably better to just always apply this pattern.
+
+Include a Failsafe-Mode
+=======================
+
+While making your system fully decentralised will remove any intermediary,
+it might be a good idea, especially for new code, to include some kind
+of fail-safe-mechanism:
+
+You can add a function in your smart contract that performs some
+self-checks like "Has any Ether leaked?",
+"Is the sum of the tokens equal to the balance of the contract?" or similar things.
+Keep in mind that you cannot use too much gas for that, so help through off-chain
+computations might be needed there.
+
+If the self-check fails, the contract automatically switches into some kind
+of "failsafe" mode, which e.g. disables most of the features, hands over
+control to a fixed and trusted third party or just converts the contract into
+a simple "give me back my money"-contract.
+
+
+*******************
+Formal Verification
+*******************
+
+Using formal verification, it is possible to perform an automated mathematical
+proof that your source code fulfills a certain formal specification.
+The specification is still formal (just as the source code), but usually much
+simpler. There is a prototype in Solidity that performs formal verification and
+it will be better documented soon.
+
+Note that formal verification itself can only help you understand the
+difference between what you did (the specification) and how you did it
+(the actual implementation). You still need to check whether the specification
+is what you wanted and that you did not miss any unintended effects of it. \ No newline at end of file